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Abstract
We consider a community of users who must make periodic decisions about whether to
interact with one another. We propose a protocol which allows honest users to reliably interact
with each other, while limiting the damage done by each malicious or incompetent user. The
worst-case cost per user is sublinear in the average number of interactions per user and is
independent of the number of users. Our guarantee holds simultaneously for every group of
honest users. For example, multiple groups of users with incompatible tastes or preferences can
coexist.
As a motivating example, we consider a game where players have periodic opportunities to
do one another favors but minimal ability to determine when a favor was done. In this setting,
our protocol achieves nearly optimal collective welfare while remaining resistant to exploitation.
Our results also apply to a collaborative filtering setting where users must make periodic
decisions about whether to interact with resources such as movies or restaurants. In this setting,
we guarantee that any set of honest users achieves a payoff nearly as good as if they had identified
the optimal set of items in advance and then chosen to interact only with resources from that
set.
1 Introduction
Trust and reciprocity distinguish repeated interactions within a small village from isolated inter-
actions in a massive online community. In a small group we are willing to trust each other and
expect that “what goes around comes around,” but online we are more guarded: we rely on trusted
mediators, expect others to do the bare minimum they have promised, and rarely leave ourselves
vulnerable to exploitation. Can the advantages of trust within a small group be realized at a global
scale, in an environment where repeat interactions are rare and manipulation will be rampant if it
is profitable?
We help address this question by showing that a subset of individuals who intend to trust and
help each other can reap the benefits even in the presence of a large majority of exploitative
manipulators. This result continues to hold when feedback is extremely noisy, individuals engage
in only a handful of interactions, and the manipulators coordinate adversarially. Our per-user
performance guarantees are completely independent of the size of the community.
We use online learning over positive semidefinite matrices to iteratively adjust a symmetric measure
of trust. This symmetric measure is coupled with a non-trivial system for tracking reciprocal
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obligations. The result is a protocol which guarantees that the honest users perform nearly as well
as if they had simply excluded all dishonest users.
1.1 Motivating example
Consider a set of N users with periodic opportunities to do one another favors. In each round, two
users Alice and Bob are chosen at random; Alice may choose to a pay a cost of 1, and if she does
then Bob receives an expected benefit of 1 + ε.
If the users were maximizing collective welfare then they would always take these opportunities.
After kN rounds the average user’s payoff would be εk. But such an altruistic community is open to
exploitation by defectors, who receive favors but don’t reliably pay them back. Is there an altruistic
strategy which can achieve high collective welfare but isn’t vulnerable to such exploitation?
We assume that a favor confers an expected benefit of 1 + ε, but that the actual benefit is either 0
or ρ. In this case three distinct outcomes are indistinguishable to most users:
• Alice does Bob a favor, but by chance the benefit is 0.
• Alice claims to have done a favor for Bob, though in fact she did not.
• Bob claims not to have received a favor, though in fact he did.
Suppose some set of αN “honest” users is willing to follow whatever protocol we specify. If they
knew each other’s identities in advance, then after kN rounds these users could achieve an average
benefit of αεk by always doing favors for each other and never doing unreciprocated favors for
outsiders. We show how to obtain a result nearly this good without knowing the identities of the
honest users in advance. Namely, we show that there is a protocol which allows the average honest
user a payoff of αεk −O
(
ρk2/3
α
)
after kN rounds, regardless of how the dishonest users behave or
how many of them there are.
2 The model
Consider a set of N users and a sequence of rounds, t = 0, 1, . . .. In each round, a pair of users
xt0, x
t
1 ∈ [N ] is chosen by nature, along with a pair of payoffs pt0, pt1 ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. All users learn the
values xt0, x
t
1. The users x
t
i choose whether to interact, picking s
t
i ∈ {0, 1}. If either user picks 0
then they don’t interact and both receive a payoff of 0. If both users pick 1 then they do interact
and xi receives a payoff p
t
i. Each user learns the payoff they receive but not what payoff their
partner received.
For the analysis, we fix a set H ⊂ [N ] of “honest” users who will follow whatever protocol we
prescribe and whose welfare we will seek to maximize. Our guarantees will simultaneously hold
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for any set H whose members follow our protocol. We will assume that the users have access to
unlimited cheap talk (in the form of broadcasts), verifiable identities, and a shared random beacon.1
The payoff of a user p≤T (x) is the sum of their payoffs in rounds they participated in:
p≤T (x) =
∑
i,t≤T :xti=x
st0=s
t
1=1
pti.
Let p≤T (H) be the total payoff of the honest users after T rounds, i.e.
p≤T (H) =
∑
x∈H
p≤T (x) .
We define the benchmark OPT≤T (H) to be the counterfactual payoff of the honest users if they
had always interacted with each other and only with each other:
OPT≤T (H) =
∑
t≤T
xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
pt0 + p
t
1
)
.
In some of our results we include the possibility of transfers. If transfers are available, player xti
chooses a payment τ ti ≥ 0 to make to their partner at the end of round t. Player xt0 then receives an
additional payoff of τ t1 − τ t0 and player xt1 receives an additional payoff of τ t0 − τ t1. These additional
payoffs are included in the sum defining p≤T (x).
Our framework only considers interactions between users, but by introducing users who always
agree to interact and always receive a payoff of 0 we can easily model static resources such as
movies, news articles, or merchants who don’t care whom they interact with. Some of our results
concern the collaborative filtering setting, in which each interaction involves one resource and one
user. For notational convenience, we will assume that the resource is always xt1 and the user is
always xt0. In this setting the set H contains both honest users and some set of resources. To obtain
the best bounds we will usually imagine that H contains the “optimal” set of items according to
the users in H, i.e. all items which yield a positive payoff on average.
We have described the interactions as being proposed “by nature” but these interactions can also
be proposed by the users. Our protocol can be used as a black box within a larger system designed
to maximize OPT≤T (H).2
3 The results
Our main result is the following:
1The assumptions of verifiable identities, broadcast communication, and a random beacon can be replaced by the
use of signature schemes and coin flipping protocols or by the availability of a trusted central party.
2This could involve using machine learning or simple heuristics to predict which interactions will be positive, or
identifying items a user wants to buy and proposing a popular merchant who sells them, or any number of alternatives.
It also falls on the system to estimate the opportunity cost of a mediocre interaction, as discussed in Section 3.
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Theorem 1. There is a randomized polynomial time protocol which yields expected performance
p≤T (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
for every set H of honest users, assuming that one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. Transfers are available.
2. In every round pt1 = 0. (The collaborative filtering setting.)
3. In every round with xt0, x
t
1 ∈ H the payoffs are symmetric ex ante: E
[
pt0
]
= E
[
pt1
]
, condi-
tioned on xt0, x
t
1, and all information available before round t.
Note that the favor setting described in Section 1.1 satisfies this ex ante symmetry condition,
provided that Alice has an opportunity to do Bob a favor with the same probability that Bob has
an opportunity to do Alice a favor.3
If we hold fixed the ratio k = T/N , then the regret is O
(
ρNk2/3
)
. So the introduction of each
dishonest user increases the total regret by O
(
ρk2/3
)
over the first k interactions.4
If we also hold fixed the ratio α = |H| /N = α, then the per-user regret bound is independent of
N . In massive communities, this requires two interacting users to make informed decisions even if
they are connected only by a long and tenuous chain of mutual acquaintances.
We also prove the following lower bound on the achievable regret:
Theorem 8. For every protocol and every T , there exists a set of payoffs and a set H such that
p≤T (H) ≤ OPT≤T (H)− Ω
(
ρ
√
NT
)
in expectation, even assuming that pt0 = p
t
1 in every interaction.
That is, over the first k interactions it is necessary for the honest users to collectively pay a cost of
Ω
(
ρk1/2
)
per dishonest user just to get enough information to statistically identify them.
There is a tension between choosing a smaller set H—for which the optimum payoff may be higher—
and choosing a larger set H in order to amortize the loss O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
over a larger set. For col-
laborative filtering in particular, recommendations optimized for a smaller group of users will be
strictly better. This tension is only in the analysis, however, since the guarantee applies simultane-
ously for every group H. As T grows and the term O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
becomes less important, the best
3Some condition of this form is clearly necessary. For example, suppose that Alice has an opportunity to do Bob
a favor in every round. If Alice does not take these opportunities, then we have failed to maximize collective welfare.
But if Alice does take these opportunities, then we have failed to maximize Alice’s welfare. Since we need to satisfy
the theorem for both H = {Alice} and H = {Alice,Bob}, either way we are in trouble.
4 The addition of an honest user also increases the regret by O
(
ρk2/3
)
, but typically decreases the average regret
per honest user. If an α fraction of users are honest, then the average regret per honest user is O
(
ρk2/3
α
)
.
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analysis might obtain for smaller and smaller groups H, and to compete the algorithm must make
more and more finely-tuned recommendations.
We note that our model differs from many other approaches to reputation systems or collaborative
recommendation; our protocol merely filters proposed interactions, rather than recommending
optimal interactions. It is up to the users of the system to propose interactions, and also to
estimate the opportunity cost of mediocre interactions (we assume that any interaction with a
positive payoff was good, so 0 needs to represent the “indifferent” outcome; watching a good movie
should have a negative payoff, if I would otherwise watch a great movie).
In some settings this seems like an acceptable model. For example, I might browse an online
marketplace, find an item that looks like a good deal, and then use the merchant’s reputation to
decide whether to purchase it. Or I might see a movie which looks interesting and use reviews to
decide whether to watch it.
In other settings this is a very inappropriate model. For example, I might have the choice between
hundreds of merchants offering the same item. In this case I just want to be recommended the best
one. Our results would need to be strengthened to be applicable in such settings.
See Section 11 for a more extensive discussion of modeling issues, limitations, and directions for
further work. Our protocol makes a qualitatively novel guarantee, but there is ample room for im-
provement. For example, our algorithm is not distributed, the protocol is not incentive-compatible
for honest users, and we only consider sequential interactions.
4 The protocol
Our main algorithmic contribution is an online learning algorithm which could be used by a central
planner to decide which pairs of users should interact. The primary difficulty is that the set H
is not known in advance and so we need to simultaneously lower bound the total payoff of every
set H. This is an unusual guarantee, and requires a novel technical approach. This algorithm is
outlined in Section 4.1 and formally analyzed in Section 6.
This algorithm can then be used directly to achieve our guarantees when pt1 = 0 or when p
t
0 = p
t
1. If
transfers are available, we reduce to the case pt0 = p
t
1 by using transfers to equalize the two payoffs.
These reductions are routine, and are analyzed in Section 7.
The most challenging condition in Theorem 1 is ex ante symmetry. To address this case we
introduce a digital currency, and use transfers of this currency to equalize payoffs. The primary
difficulty is ensuring that there is sufficient liquidity to facilitate transactions between honest users.
We propose a robust protocol based on logarithmic utility functions. This system is outlined in
Section 4.2 and formally analyzed in Section 8.
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4.1 Outline of the central planner’s algorithm
Consider the following single-payoff problem faced by a central planner: in each round a pair of
individuals xt0, x
t
1 ∈ [N ] is given, the planner outputs st ∈ [0, 1] representing the probability with
which xt0 and x
t
1 should interact, and then nature reveals a payoff p
t for the interaction.
There are two different payoffs associated with a set H in this game, depending on whether we
think of the payoff as accruing to player 0 or player 1:
p≤Ti (H) =
∑
t≤T :xti∈H
stpt.
We can create a symmetric version, in which the payoff is shared equally between the two players,
by averaging p≤T0 and p
≤T
1 . All of these different payoff notions are associated with the same
benchmark:
OPT≤T (H) =
∑
t≤T :xt0,x
t
1∈H
pt.
We exhibit an algorithm PLAN satisfying:
Theorem 3. Suppose that ptst ∈ [−ρ, ρ] and that E [pt] ∈ [−ρ, ρ] conditioned on xt0, xt1 and the
information from all previous rounds. Then for every H,T and i, PLAN achieves payoffs satisfying
p≤Ti (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
in expectation.
This protocol can be used almost directly to achieve low regret when pt1 = 0 (by applying the
lower bound on p≤T0 (H)) or when p
t
0 = p
t
1 (by applying the lower bound on p
≤T (H) = p≤T0 (H) +
p≤T1 (H)).
The basic outline of our algorithm PLAN is:
• The planner initializes a matrix P tab, indexed by a, b ∈ [N ], with P 0ab = 1.
• In step t, the planner outputs st = P t
xt0x
t
1
.
• After step t, the planner uses an online learning algorithm to predict matrices Ct+1ab (for cut)
and J t+1ab (for join).
• The planner then updates
P t+1ab = P
t
ab − Ct+1ab P tab + J t+1ab (1− P tab)
= (1 − J t+1ab −Ct+1ab )P tab + J t+1ab
The matrices Ct+1ab and J
t+1
ab are chosen by the online learning algorithm with the goal of
maximizing pt+1st+1.
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J t and Ct are predicted by the online local learning algorithm from [4], which achieves payoffs as
high as the best fixed matrices of the form
Jab = P
(
ℓ(a) = ℓ(b) = 0
)
Cab = P
((
ℓ(a) = 0, ℓ(b) = 1
) ∨ (ℓ(a) = −1, ℓ(b) = 0))
for any distribution over labelings ℓ : [N ]→ {−1, 0, 1}.
The most counterintuitive feature of the algorithm is that the predicted matrices are used to adjust
P , rather than to directly determine which users should interact. This allows the protocol to build
up more complex patterns of interaction as time goes on, and is needed to minimize regret for every
set H simultaneously. Other approaches we tried, such as using an online learning algorithm with
a richer comparison class, were unable to achieve this guarantee.
The analysis proceeds in several steps:
• The online learning guarantee implies that the matrices P tab perform nearly as well as any
sequence of the form
Qtab(J
∗, C∗) = (1− J∗ab − C∗ab)P t−1ab + J∗ab,
where J∗ and R∗ are constant matrices from the comparison class. That is, the recommen-
dations J t and Ct are nearly optimal within this class.
• The strong smoothness lemma for the online learning algorithm implies that J tab and Ctab
change slowly. Using this fact and a non-trivial analysis of our update rule we prove that∣∣∣P tab − P t−1ab ∣∣∣ is small on average. This implies that the matrices Qt perform nearly as well as
the matrices
Rtab(J
∗, C∗) = (1− J∗ab − C∗ab)P tab + J∗ab.
(The superscript on P has changed from t − 1 to t; this difference may appear small, but it
leads to a much harder analysis and ultimately to our suboptimal dependence on T .)
• We show that if p≤T0 (H) ≪ OPT≤T (H), then there is some pair of matrices J∗, C∗ in the
comparison class such that the matrices Rt(J∗, C∗) substantially outperform the matrices P t.
Namely, we can take J∗ab = 1 for a, b ∈ H, and C∗ab = 1 for a ∈ H, b 6∈ H. Similarly, if
p≤T1 (H)≪ OPT≤T (H) then we can take C∗ab = 1 for a 6∈ H, b ∈ H
• (1) and (2) together imply that the matrices Rt(J∗, C∗) cannot much outperform P t for
any J∗, C∗ in the comparison class. Combined with (3), this implies that we can’t have
p≤Ti (H)≪ OPT≤T (H).
Surprisingly, the bottleneck in the quantitative analysis is actually in step (2);5 we take a small
learning rate to control the differences
∣∣∣P t+1ab − P tab∣∣∣. This is not just a technical requirement.
Because the central planner’s updates are both optimal and small, we can infer that there are no
big adjustments to be made. This property is what lets us ensure that the central planner is making
adjustments often enough to “exhaust” all of the good ones.
5though if this bottleneck were addressed, the rest of our analysis would need to be tightened in order to actually
improve the results
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4.2 Protocol for ex ante symmetric interactions
Recall the ex ante symmetry condition:
E
[
pt0 − pt1
∣∣∣xt0, xt1,K<t] = 0
where K<t is a transcript of all of the events prior to round t. In this section we describe a protocol
which achieves low regret under this condition.
Our approach is to assign each user a level of wealth w(x) > 0. A high value of w(x) indicates a
debt owed to a user by the rest of the community, while a low value indicates a debt owed by the
user. Whenever pt0 6= pt1, we adjust w
(
xt0
)
and w
(
xt1
)
so that the “effective payoffs” of the two
users are equal and the total wealth w
(
xt0
)
+ w
(
xt1
)
is conserved. Because the effective payoffs
are symmetric, we can apply the central planner’s algorithm to guarantee that the total effective
payoff is large. Over the long-run the budget constraints w (x) > 0 imply that the actual payoffs
can’t be too different from the effective payoffs.
We first considered various straightforward approaches in which payoffs were directly translated
into changes in wealth, i.e. which equalized the effective payoffs
pt0 +∆w
(
xt0
)
= pt1 +∆w
(
xt1
)
.
The difficulty with these proposals was maintaining the invariant w(x) > 0. In order to prevent
a violation, we need to prevent interactions with users who have low w(x). But this means that
if insufficient liquidity is available, interactions between honest users will stop. This issue made
it very difficult to analyze protocols of this type, and in most cases were able to find concrete
situations in which these protocols performed poorly,6 even in the simple favor setting described in
Section 1.1.
Instead we define the effective payoff as the actual payoff plus the change in log wealth, and equalize
this quantity:
pt0 +∆ log
(
w
(
xt0
))
= pt1 +∆ log
(
w
(
xt1
))
.
This automatically leads our learning protocol to place less weight on the payoffs of users who run
up substantial deficits, preventing them from causing too much damage. At the same time, we
never have to block an interaction between honest users due to insufficient funds; as w(x)→ 0 the
system places a higher and higher value on changes in w(x), which prevent it from ever setting
w(x) ≤ 0. The resulting protocol seems to be self-correcting and highly robust to liquidity shortages
or imbalances of payments.
6Manipulators can break many systems by hoarding currency, either by doing too many nice things or by slightly
understating their own payoffs. This creates a liquidity problem amongst the honest users, which is difficult to correct
without creating enough currency for the dishonest users to run up destructively large deficits. If this attempted
manipulation fails, manipulators can slightly understate their own payoffs when interacting with some honest users
and slightly overstate them when interacting with others, creating an imbalance of payments among the honest users
which has a similar effect.
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5 Related work
In this section we discuss a number of related threads in the literature. Our novel contribution is
a performance guarantee in the face of general attacks and in a general environment, rather than
considering narrower threat models or making restrictive assumptions about the domain.
Collaborative filtering: There is a large literature on collaborative filtering spanning a wide
range of techniques; see [19] for an overview.
Technically the most closely related results are matrix prediction algorithms that achieve low regret
compared to the comparison class of matrices with small trace norm, and in particular the recent
results for online matrix prediction due to Hazan, Kale, and Shalev-Shwartz [9] and the similar
work by the author [4]. However, filtering systems based directly on these algorithms would be
vulnerable to manipulation.
Another line of related work investigates the recovery of preference functions; for example see
[1, 2, 7]. Some of this work uses assumptions similar to our implicit assumptions, for example the
existence of large groups with concordant preferences. This line of work differs in that it aims
to reconstruct the entire preference table rather than simply filtering proposed interactions. This
stronger goal is unattainable in our noisy and adversarial setting.
Competitive collaborative learning: From a modeling perspective, our work is most similar to,
and inspired by, the competitive collaborative learning framework of Awerbuch and Kleinberg [3].
In this setting each user must choose a resource in a series of rounds, and the aim is to ensure that
the honest players perform as well as if they had all chosen the single best fixed resource in every
round. Like us, they rely on machinery from online learning and convert online learning guarantees
into regret bounds for the honest users.
However, this work focuses on identifying an optimal resource to use in every round, rather than
considering binary decisions across varying conditions. As a result, we use quite different technical
tools and are applicable in very different settings.
Transitive trust: Another literature explicitly examines chains of trust relationships, by which
one user can indirectly trust another; for example see [10, 15]. The techniques in this literature
tend to focus on a binary notion of links as being either honest or dishonest. This assumption is
appropriate in some settings (for example with respect to cryptographic credentials) but not in our
target applications.
Manipulation-resistance: Another literature addresses the question of modifying recommenda-
tion systems to limit the influence of sybils, fake identities controlled by an attacker. For example,
see [22, 14]. The robustness guarantees achieved in this literature are similar to our own, but the
results are restricted to the setting where a decision-maker can get useful feedback from the same
source across many different decisions. In our setting only a handful of users have information
about each decision, and so a decision-maker can only rarely get direct advice from the same source
more than once. In exchange, we achieve weaker bounds on the damage done per sybil.
Economic systems for P2P networks: Many decentralized economic protocols have been pro-
posed to reduce the scope for free-riding and enforce reciprocity, especially in the context of Peer-
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to-Peer (P2P) networks; for some representative examples see [5, 13, 20, 8, 17, 16].
Driven by our desire to obtain end-to-end performance guarantees, we focus on robustly addressing
liquidity constraints and possible payment imbalances, issues which have received little theoretical
attention. These issues are particularly important because we assume that users only sometimes
have the opportunity to provide valuable services, rather than assuming that such opportunities
are always readily available.
Conversely, we do not confront any of the practical issues involved in tracking payments. Our
protocol would need to be implemented on top of another system for managing digital payments.
We also rely on our symmetric reputation system to provide appropriate incentives for honest
reporting, sidestepping another prominent issue in the existing literature.
Other reputation systems: Reputation systems have been the focus of substantial research
across a wide range of contexts, for example see [11, 12, 21]. P2P networks and online marketplaces
have enjoyed the most attention.
To make a decision in these systems, a user consults feedback from peers who have made similar
decisions, and trusts each source of feedback according to their past reliability. This is conceptually
similar to our framework, although we use different technical tools and the resulting protocol is
much more resistant to manipulation.
It may be possible to bridge the gap between our proposal and more practical reputation systems.
For example, EigenTrust [12] is a reputation system which uses random walks to compute the
maximum eigenvector of an interaction graph. Although it is vulnerable to manipulation, the
protocol is much more efficient than ours. By changing the online learning algorithm used by the
central planner in our protocol, it might be possible to replace our use of semidefinite programming
by a distributed algorithm based on random walks, achieving the best of both approaches.
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6 Appendix: The central planner’s algorithm
6.1 The algorithm
We use the algorithm OLLε for online local learning from [4]. We will apply that algorithm to
labelings ℓ : [N ]→ {−1, 0, 1}, i.e. to 3N×3N matrices with rows and columns indexed by elements
of [N ]× {−1, 0, 1}. We consider a sequence of matrices Et ∈ R3N×3N . Write E≤T =∑t≤T Et and
similarly for E<T . Then OLLε
(
E<T
)
is defined as the solution to the following semidefinite
program:7
argmax
X∈R3N×3N
X0
0≤X(a,i)(b,j)≤1
ε
〈
X,E<T
〉
+ log det (X + I)
where 〈X,E〉 is the matrix inner product ∑a,i,b,j X(a,i)(b,j)E(a,i)(b,j).
For us, the important properties of OLLε are given by the following results:
Theorem 9. [4] For any sequence Et and any X  0 with entries in [0, 1], we have
∑
t<T
〈
Et,OLLε
(
E<t
)〉
≥
∑
t<T
〈
Et,X
〉
−O

ε∑
t<T
∣∣∣Et∣∣∣2
1

−O (Nε−1)
7The algorithm in [4] maximized under some additional equality constraints, e.g.
∑
iX(a,i)(a,i) = 1. For our
purposes it doesn’t matter whether we include these or not, and for ease of exposition we omit them. It is easy
to verify that this leaves the results of [4] unchanged; using these extra inequalities would also leave our results
unchanged.
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where
∣∣Et∣∣
1
is the sum of the absolute values of the entries of Et.
Lemma 7. [4] For any E<t and any Et we have∣∣∣∣OLLε (E<t)−OLLε (E≤t)
∣∣∣∣
∞
≤ O
(
ε
∣∣∣Et∣∣∣
1
)
Our statement of Theorem 9 and Lemma 7 are slightly different from the statements in [4], so we
present proofs in Section 10.
We can now define the central planner’s algorithm PLANε. This algorithm is parametrized by a
learning rate ε < 116 ; in order to achieve the unparametrized version we decrease ε over time. Let
be the sparse matrix with Zt
xt0x
t
1
= pt. Given
{
Zt
}
t<T
, the following algorithm gives the central
planner’s recommendations in round T :
• Set P 0ab = 1 for a, b ∈ [N ].
• For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1:
– Define Et to be the sparse matrix with the following non-zero entries:
Et(a,0)(b,0) = (1− P tab)Ztab
Et(a,0)(b,1) = −P tabZtab
Et(a,−1)(b,0) = −P tabZtab.
– Let Xt+1 = OLLε/ρ
(
E≤t
)
.
– Define
Ct+1ab =
1
4
Xt+1(a,0)(b,1) +
1
4
Xt+1(a,−1)(b,0)
J t+1ab =
1
4
Xt+1(a,0)(b,0) + ε
1/2
– Update P by P t+1ab = (1−Ct+1ab −J t+1ab )P t+1ab +J t+1ab . The construction of Et ensures that
ptP t
xt0x
t
1
is a linear function of
〈
Xt, Et
〉
.
• Output sT = P T
xT0 x
T
1
.
6.2 Analysis
For convenience, we will write pt (P ) for the payoff the planner would obtain by using the matrix
P in round t, namely
pt (P ) = ptPxt0xt1 .
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We write U
(
P t,X
)
for the matrix that would be obtained by updating P t with the matrix Xt+1 =
X, i.e. defined by the equations
Cab =
1
4
X(a,0)(b,1) +
1
4
X(a,−1)(b,0),
Jab =
1
4
X(a,0)(b,0) + ε
1/2,
U
(
P t,X
)
ab
= (1− Cab − Jab)P tab + Jab
Lemma 1. For any X  0 with 0 ≤ X(i,a)(j,b) ≤ 1 we have
∑
t≤T
pt
(
P t
)
≥
∑
t≤T
pt
(
U
(
P t−1,X
))
−O
(
ε
ρ
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣2)−O(ρN
ε
)
,
where P t are the matrices computed by PLANε.
Proof. We have pt
(
P t
)
= pt
(
U
(
P t−1,Xt
))
. Moreover,
pt
(
U
(
P t−1,X
))
= pt
(
(1− Jxt0xt1 − Cxt0xt1)P
t−1
xt0x
t
1
+ Jxt0xt1
)
= pt
(
P t−1
xt0x
t
1
)
+ Jxt0xt1p
t
(
1− P t−1
xt0x
t
1
)
− Cxt0xt1p
tP t−1
xt0x
t
1
= pt
(
P t−1
)
+
1
4
〈
X,Et
〉
+ βt,
where J and C are defined from X in the same way that J t and Ct are defined from Xt, and
βt = ε1/2pt(1 − P t−1
xt0x
t
0
) doesn’t depend on X. We constructed the matrix Et precisely so that it
would satisfy this identity.
Because Xt = OLLε/ρ
(
E<t
)
, by Theorem 9 we have
∑
t≤T
pt
(
P t
)
=
∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
P t−1
)
+
1
4
〈
Xt, Et
〉
+ βt
)
≥
∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
P t−1
)
+
1
4
〈
X,Et
〉
+ βt
)
−O
(
ε
ρ
∑∣∣∣Et∣∣∣2
1
)
−O
(
ρN
ε
)
=
∑
t≤T
pt
(
U
(
P t−1,X
))
−O
(
ε
ρ
∑∣∣∣Et∣∣∣2
1
)
−O
(
ρN
ε
)
=
∑
t≤T
pt
(
U
(
P t−1,X
))
−O
(
ε
ρ
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣2)−O(ρN
ε
)
,
where the last equality holds because
∣∣Et∣∣
1
= 3
∣∣pt∣∣.
Lemma 2. For any a, b, we have
∑
t<T
∣∣∣P t+1ab − P tab∣∣∣ = O

ε1/2
ρ
∑
t<T
∣∣∣pt∣∣∣

+O (1) ,
where P t are the matrices computed by PLANε.
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Proof. Consider the “steady state” value of P given J and C, defined as
Y tab =
J tab
J tab + C
t
ab
.
This is the value to which P would converge if J and C were left unchanged for many iterations.
We will show that Y t does not change very quickly, and that P t is “following” Y t and hence does
not change very quickly either.
Note that each entry of J t and Ct is defined to be a constant multiple of an entry of OLLε/ρ
(
E<t
)
,
and that the entry-wise ℓ1 norm of E
t is O (pt). So by Lemma 7, we know that ∣∣∣J t+1ab − J tab∣∣∣ ≤ ερ ∣∣pt∣∣,
and similarly
∣∣∣Ct+1ab − Ctab∣∣∣ ≤ ερ ∣∣pt∣∣. By definition we have Ctab ≥ 0 and J tab ≥ ε1/2. Together these
facts imply that
∣∣∣Y t+1ab − Y tab∣∣∣ = O (ε1/2ρ ∣∣pt∣∣).
By the definition of P t+1, we have
P t+1ab = (1− J tab − Ctab)P tab + J tab
= (1− J tab − Ctab)P tab + (J tab + Ctab)Y tab
By the definition of J and C, we have J tab + C
t
ab ≤ 14 + 14 + 14 + ε1/2 ≤ 1. Thus P t+1 is a convex
combination of P tab and Y
t
ab. In particular,∣∣∣P tab − Y tab∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣P tab − P t+1ab ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣P t+1ab − Y tab∣∣∣ .
Intuitively this suggests that
∑∣∣∣P t+1ab − P tab∣∣∣ ≤∑∣∣∣Y t+1ab − Y tab∣∣∣, from which the desired result would
follow.
To see this formally, consider the total length of the path
P 0ab, P
1
ab, . . . , P
t
ab, Y
t
ab,
i.e. the sum of the absolute values of the differences between consecutive points. If we change this
path by adding a new point:
P 0ab, P
1
ab, . . . , P
t
ab, P
t+1
ab , Y
t
ab
we don’t change the total length, because P t+1 is in between P t and Y t. If we then change this
path by changing the last point:
P 0ab, P
1
ab, . . . , P
t
ab, P
t+1
ab , Y
t+1
ab
we increase the total length by at most
∣∣∣Y t+1ab − Y tab∣∣∣.
By induction, the total length of the path is thus
∑∣∣∣Y t+1ab − Y tab∣∣∣ + O (1), and this total length
upper bounds
∑∣∣∣P t+1ab − P tab∣∣∣.
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The next step is to prove that if the honest players are not collectively performing well, then there
is some recommendation the central planner could have made which would generate a substantial
improvement.
The reason for the ε1/2 loss in this theorem is our restriction that J t ≥ ε1/2, which lower bounds
the central planner’s ability to stop honest and dishonest users from interacting and was needed to
prevent rapid changes in P t.
Lemma 3. For any set H there is a matrix XH  0, with 0 ≤ XH(i,a)(j,b) ≤ 1, such that
OPT≤T (H)− p≤Ti (H) = O

∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
)
+ ε1/2
∣∣∣pt∣∣∣
) ,
where P t are the matrices produced by PLANε.
Proof. Observe that PLANε is perfectly symmetrical under an exchange of x
t
0 and x
t
1: the only
difference is that the matrices P t are transposed, and the indices of X(a,i)(b,j) are modified by
exchanging +1 and −1. So it suffices to prove the theorem for i = 0.
Define the vector vH via v(a,0) = 1 for a ∈ H, v(a,1) = 1 for a 6∈ H, and v(a,i) = 0 otherwise. Define
the matrix XH as
(
vH
)(
vH
)T
. This matrix is clearly PSD, and has entries in [0, 1].
Suppose a 6∈ H. Then XH(a,i)(b,j) = 0, and so U
(
P t,XH
)
ab
= P tab. Alternatively, suppose a ∈ H.
Then X(a,−1)(b,0) = 0, and exactly one of X(a,0)(b,0) and X(a,0)(b,1) is 1, according to whether b ∈ H.
So for a, b ∈ H, we have
U
(
P t,XH
)
ab
=
3
4
P tab +
1
4
+ ε1/2(1− P tab).
For a ∈ H, b 6∈ H, we have
U
(
P t,XH
)
ab
=
3
4
P tab + ε
1/2(1− P tab).
We compute:∑
t≤T :xt0∈H
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
≥ 3
4
∑
t≤T :xt0∈H
pt
(
P t
)
+
1
4
∑
t≤T :xt0,x
t
1∈H
pt − ε1/2
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣
= p≤Ti (H)−
1
4
p≤Ti (H) +
1
4
OPT≤T (H)− ε1/2
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣
Rearranging, and using the fact that U
(
P t,XH
)
ab
= P tab for a 6∈ H:
OPT≤T (H)− p≤Ti (H) = 4
∑
t≤T :xt0∈H
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
)
+ ε1/2
∣∣∣pt∣∣∣
)
= 4
∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
)
+ ε1/2
∣∣∣pt∣∣∣
)
,
as desired.
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We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 2. Suppose that ptst ∈ [−ρ, ρ] and E [pt] ∈ [−ρ, ρ] conditioned on the preceding rounds.
Then
p≤Ti (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρε1/2T
)
−O
(
ρN
ε
)
in expectation, where p≤Ti (H) is the payoff achieved by PLANε.
Proof. By Lemma 3, there exists an XH  0 with 0 ≤ XH(a,i)(b,j) ≤ 1 such that
OPT≤T (H)− p≤Ti (H) = O

∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
)
+ ε1/2
∣∣∣pt∣∣∣
)

≤ O

∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
))
+ ρε1/2T


in expectation, where the second equality holds because E
[∣∣pt∣∣] ≤ ρ. So it suffices to bound∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt (P t)
)
.
Note that PLANε always satisfies s
t = P t
xt0x
t
1
≥ J t
xt0x
t
1
≥ ε1/2, and consequently ∣∣pt∣∣ ≤ stρ = ε1/2ρ .
We have
∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
))
=
∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t,XH
))
− pt
(
U
(
P t−1,XH
)))
+
∑
t≤T
(
pt
(
U
(
P t−1,XH
))
− pt
(
P t
))
≤
∑
t≤T
pt
∣∣∣∣U (P t,XH)− U (P t−1,XH)
∣∣∣∣
∞
+O
(
ε
ρ
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣2)+O(ρN
ε
)
≤
∑
t≤T
pt
∣∣∣P t − P t−1∣∣∣
∞
+O
(
ε1/2
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣)+O(ρN
ε
)
≤ ρ
∑
t≤T
∣∣∣P t − P t−1∣∣∣
∞
+O
(
ε1/2
∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣)+O(ρN
ε
)
≤ ε1/2
∑
t≤T
∣∣∣pt∣∣∣+O (ε1/2∑∣∣∣pt∣∣∣)+O(ρN
ε
)
= O
(
ρε1/2T
)
+O
(
ρN
ε
)
where the third line uses the definition of pt and Theorem 1, the fourth line uses the definition of
U (·, ·) and the upper bound
∣∣pt∣∣ ≤ ρε−1/2, the fifth line uses the bound E [pt] ≤ ρ conditioned on
previous rounds (and in particular conditioned on
∣∣P t − P t−1∣∣
∞
, which can be computed before
round t) the sixth line uses Theorem 2, and the seventh line uses the bound E
[
pt
] ≤ ρ.
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By setting ε = N
2/3
T 2/3
and using a standard doubling trick, we obtain a more convenient form:
Theorem 3. Under the same conditions as Theorem 2, there is an algorithm PLAN for the central
planner which achieves an expected payoff of
p≤Ti (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
.
Proof. Every time T = 2k, we start a new copy of PLANε with ε = εk = N
2/3T−2/3.
By Theorem 2, we have
∑
2k≤t<2k+1
xit∈H
ptst ≥
∑
2k≤t<2k+1
xt0,x
t
1∈H
pt −O
(
ρε
1/2
k 2
k
)
−O
(
ρN
εk
)
=
∑
2k≤t<2k+1
xt0,x
t
1∈H
pt −O
(
ρ22/3kN1/3
)
Summing from k = 0 to k =
⌈
log (T )
⌉
, we obtain the desired bound.
7 Appendix: Algorithms for symmetric payoffs, collaborative fil-
tering, and transfers
7.1 Symmetric payoffs
We say that a game has symmetric payoffs if, in each interaction between honest users, pt0 = p
t
1.
The algorithm SYM followed by an honest user is:
• Initialize a copy of PLAN.
• For t = 0, 1, . . .:
– If you are interacting:
∗ Consult PLAN (xt0, xt1) to find the probability st with which you should interact.
∗ Using the random beacon decide whether you should interact, and broadcast the
result. If you and your partner disagree about whether you should interact, don’t
interact.
∗ If you decide to interact, observe your payoff and broadcast it. Otherwise broadcast
a payoff of 0.
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– Report a payoff of −ρ to your instance of PLAN if anything goes wrong:8 if the inter-
acting parties broadcast different payoffs, if either party makes multiple broadcasts, if
either party broadcasts a payoff outside of [−ρ, ρ], or if you disagree about whether an
interaction should have occurred (based on your independent use of the random beacon).
– Otherwise, report a payoff of pt = pt0/s
t = pt1/s
t to your instance of PLAN.
We can now apply Theorem 3
Theorem 4. If pt0 = p
t
1 in any interaction between honest users, then the algorithm SYM achieves
a payoff
p≤T (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
Proof. It is easy to verify by induction that all of the honest users’ instances of PLAN will be
perfectly synchronized, and consequently that nothing will ever go wrong in an interaction between
honest users. This also allows us to talk unambiguously about “the” instance of PLAN.
Let pt be the payoff reported to the central planner in round t. Either pt = 0, pt = −ρ, or pt = pt0/st
and pt0 ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. Thus ptst ∈ [−ρ, ρ]; because pt = pt0/st with probability at most st, and otherwise
pt ∈ [−ρ, ρ], we have E [pt] ∈ [−2ρ, 2ρ]. Thus we can apply Theorem 3 to the payoffs pt (the
difference between ρ and 2ρ makes no difference in the asymptotics).
In any interaction between honest users, we have E
[
pt
]
= pt0 = p
t
1. Moreover, in any interaction
involving an honest user, either their expected payoff is equal to stE
[
pt
]
, or else they agreed to
interact and pt = −ρ. In either case, their expected payoff is at least stE [pt].
Thus we can apply Theorem 3 twice and conclude∑
i,t:xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
pti ≥
∑
t:xt0∈H
stpt +
∑
t:xt1∈H
stpt
≥ 2
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
pt −O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
=
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
pt0 + p
t
1
)
−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
= OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
in expectation.
7.2 Collaborative filtering
Our algorithm FILTER for collaborative filtering is a nearly direct application of PLAN. Formally,
it works as follows.
8In fact outputting a payoff of −∞ would be most natural, since this should never happen in an interaction
between honest users, but this would require modifying our analysis.
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• Initialize a copy of PLAN.
• For t = 0, 1, . . .:
– If you are xt1, output s
t
1 = 1.
– If you are xt0:
∗ Consult PLAN (xt0, xt1) to find the probability st with which you should interact.
∗ Using the random beacon, output st0 = 1 with probability st and st0 = 0 otherwise.
Broadcast the result.
∗ If you interact, broadcast your payoff pt0. Otherwise broadcast 0.
– Report a payoff of −ρ to your instance of PLAN if xt0 broadcasts a payoff outside of
[−ρ, ρ] or if you disagree about whether an interaction should have occurred (based on
your independent use of the random beacon).
– Otherwise, report a payoff of pt = pt0/s
t to your instance of PLAN.
Theorem 5. If pt1 = 0 in any interaction between honest users, then the algorithm FILTER
achieves a payoff
p≤T (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
Proof. It is easy to check that the honest user’s instantiations of PLAN remain synchronized, that
E
[
pt
] ∈ [−ρ, ρ], and that ptst ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. In an interaction where xt0 is honest, it is easy to see that
E
[
stpt
]
= E
[
st0s
t
1p
t
0
]
. In an interaction where xt0, x
t
1 are both honest, then s
t
1 = 1 and we have
E
[
pt
]
= pt0.
So we have in expectation ∑
i,t≤T :xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
pti =
∑
t≤T :xt0∈H
stpt
≥
∑
t≤T :xt0,x
t
1∈H
pt −O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
=
∑
t≤T :xt0x
t
1∈H
pt0 −O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
= OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
,
as desired.
7.3 Transfers
If the payoffs aren’t symmetric, but users are allowed to make transfers, then we can reduce to the
symmetric case. That is, given an instance Itransfers of the general problem with transfers, with
payoffs pti, we will produce a new instance Isymmetric of the symmetric problem, with payoffs qti .
We will guarantee that if the uses perform well on this synthetic instance Isymmetric, then they also
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performed well on Itransfers. Since we know that SYM performs well on Isymmetric, this will yield
the desired result.
Whenever an honest user xti has to make a decision in Itransfers they ask the user xti to make the
same decision in Isymmetric. Whenever an honest user is given a payoff pti in Itransfers, they perform
the following process in order to generate the payoff qti in Isymmetric:
• Send the message pti to xt1−i, and receive the message pt1−i.
• If no message is received, or multiple messages are received, or the message contains a payoff
pt1−i 6∈ [−ρ, ρ], then set τ ti = 0.
• Otherwise set τi = max
{
pt1−i−p
t
i
2 , 0
}
.
• Report qti = pti + τ1−i − τi.
It is easy to verify that in any interaction between honest users we have
qt0 = q
t
1 =
pt0 + p
t
1
2
.
This allows us to apply the algorithm SYM to the instance Isymmetric.
Theorem 6. There is an algorithm attaining the payoff
p≤T (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
in general if transfers are available.
Proof. We apply the reduction described in this section. In any interaction between honest users
we have and in any interaction we have qti ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. So we can apply SYM to the resulting payoffs,
and we have in expectation
p≤T (H) =
∑
i,t:xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
(
pti + τ
t
1−i − τ ti
)
=
∑
i,t:xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
qti
≥
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
qt0 + q
t
1
)
−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
=
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
pt0 + p
t
1
)
−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
,
= OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
as desired.
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8 Appendix: Ex ante symmetry
As in Section 7.3 we reduce an instance Iex ante with ex ante symmetric payoffs to an instance
Isymmetric with symmetric payoffs. At the beginning of the protocol each user initializes a balance
w0 (x) = 1 for every user x. When xti receives the payoff p
t
i in Iex ante they do the following to
generate the payoff qti in Isymmetric:
• Communicate the payoff pti to xt1−i, and hear the payoff pt1−i.
• If no message is heard, or multiple messages are heard, or the message contains a payoff
pt1−i 6∈ [−ρ, ρ], then set τi = 0
• Otherwise τ ti =
δwt0w
t
1(pt1−i−pti)
2ρ(wt0+wt1)
, where wti = w
t
(
xti
)
:
• Each user updates wt+1 (xti) = wt (xti)+ τ ti . For x 6∈ {xt0, xt1}, wt+1 (x) = wt (x).
• Report the payoff qti = pti + 2ρδ
τ ti
wti
.
Here δ < 12 is a parameter of the reduction.
It is easy to verify that in any interaction between honest users, both users will report a payoff of
qt0 = q
t
1 =
w0p
t
0 + w1p
t
1
w0 + w1
.
This is very similar to the protocol with transfers, except that the payoff of an interaction is now
a weighted average of the individual payoffs. Once again, we can apply the algorithm SYM to
Isymmetric. The aim the analysis will be to show that if the payoff in Isymmetric is good, then so is
the payoff in Iex ante, which is less straightforward than in the case with transfers.
It is easy to verify that
∣∣τ ti ∣∣ ≤ δwti , so that each wt (x) changes by at most a factor of (1 ± δ) in
any round. Since δ < 12 , this guarantees that w
t (x) > 0.
The mechanism used to track the quantities wt (x) is not particularly important; for simplicity,
and because our algorithm is already hopelessly undistributed, we assumed that every user inde-
pendently tracks the quantities wt (x) for every other user. It would be straightforward, however,
to use a more efficient implementation of digital cash such as [6].9 In this case a dishonest player
might decline to make an appropriate transfer, but this can be handled in the same way as in
Section 7.3.
To analyze this protocol we rely on the potential functions
UT (x) =
2ρ
δ
log
(
wT (x)
)
+ p<T (x)
We use three lemmas to relate the reported payoffs qti to the actual payoffs p
t
i.
Our first lemma relates the reported payoffs qti to the underlying payoffs p
t
i:
9Though this introduces the possibility of attacks on the payment infrastructure itself.
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Lemma 4. Under the ex ante symmetry condition, in any interaction between honest users we
have
E
[
qt0 + q
t
1
]
= E
[
pt0 + p
t
1
]
.
Proof. Under the ex ante symmetry condition, conditioned on the values of wt0 and w
t
1, and on the
users’ decision to interact, we have E
[
pt0
]
= E
[
pt1
]
. Let β0 =
wt0
wt0+w
t
1
and β1 =
wt1
wt0+w
t
1
. Then we
have
E
[
qt0 + q
t
1
]
= 2E
[
β0p
t
0 + β1p
t
1
]
= 2β0E
[
pt0
]
+ 2β1E
[
pt1
]
= β0E
[
pt0 + p
t
1
]
+ β1E
[
pt0 + p
t
1
]
= E
[
pt0 + p
t
1
]
as desired.
Our second lemma relates the reported payoffs qti to the change in U
t (x):
Lemma 5. If st0 = s
t
1 = 1, then then U
t+1
(
xti
) ≥ U t (xti)+ qti −O (ρδ).
Proof. We have
U t+1
(
xti
)
=
2ρ
δ
log
(
wt+1
(
xti
))
+ p<t+1
(
xti
)
= U t
(
xti
)
+
2ρ
δ
log
(
wt+1
(
xti
)
wti
)
+ pt
(
xti
)
= U t
(
xti
)
+
2ρ
δ
log
(
1 +
τ ti
wti
)
+ pt
(
xti
)
> U t
(
xti
)
+
2ρ
δ
τ ti
wti
− 2ρδ + pt
(
xti
)
= U t
(
xti
)
+ qti − 2ρδ
where we have used the bound
∣∣∣ τ tiwti
∣∣∣ ≤ δ and the inequality log (1 + z) > z− δ2 for |z| ≤ δ ≤ 12 .
Our third lemma relates the quantities UT (x) to the payoffs p≤T (x):
Lemma 6.
p≤T (H) ≥
∑
x∈H
UT (x)− 2ρ
δ
|H| log
(
N
|H|
)
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Proof.
∑
xw
t (x) is conserved by the algorithm, and wt (x) ≥ 0, so∑
x∈H
wT (x) ≤
∑
x
wT (x) =
∑
x
w0 (x) = N.
By Jensen’s inequality,
∑
x log
(
wT (x)
)
≤ |H| log
(
N
|H|
)
. We have
p≤T (H) =
∑
x∈H
UT (x)− 2ρ
δ
∑
x∈H
log
(
wT (x)
)
≥
∑
x∈H
UT (x)− 2ρ
δ
|H| log
(
N
|H|
)
,
as desired.
Combining these three lemmas yields our desired result:
Theorem 7. There is an algorithm that obtains regret
p≤T (H) ≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
assuming that the payoffs between honest users satisfy ex ante symmetry.
Proof. We will assume that T is known in advance, and choose δ =
√
NT ; this assumption can
then be removed by a standard doubling trick exactly as in Theorem 3.
In any interaction between honest users we have qt0 = q
t
1. Moreover, q
t
i ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. Thus we can
apply SYM and Lemma 4 and obtain in expectation∑
t,i:xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
qti ≥
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
qt0 + q
t
1
)
−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
=
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
pt0 + p
t
1
)
−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
.
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Then we can apply Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 and obtain in expectation
p≤T (H) ≥
∑
x∈H
UT (x)− 2ρ
δ
|H| log
(
N
|H|
)
≥
∑
x∈H
UT (x)− 2ρN
δ
=
∑
x∈H
UT (x)−O
(
ρ
√
NT
)
≥
∑
x∈H
U0 (x) +
∑
i,t:xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
qti − ρδT −O
(
ρ
√
NT
)
=
∑
i,t:xti∈H
st0=s
t
1=1
qti −O
(
ρ
√
NT
)
≥
∑
t:xt0,x
t
1∈H
(
pt0 + p
t
1
)
−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
−O
(
ρ
√
NT
)
≥ OPT≤T (H)−O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
where the last inequality assumes T > N . If T ≤ N the result is trivial, since in this case the
maximum possible difference between p≤T (H) and OPT≤T (H) is 2ρT = O
(
ρ
3
√
NT 2
)
.
9 Appendix: Lower bounds
In this section we consider the game described in Section 6. We show that for any T , there is a set
H and a strategy for nature such that the planner’s payoff is
OPT≤T (H)− Ω
(√
NT
)
These results extend immediately to all of our other settings, because an algorithm for any of these
settings could be trivially used by the central planner (who could simply simulate the interactions
of the users and recommend that two users interact with whatever probability they interacted in
the simulation).
To prove this result we consider a randomized strategy for nature such that the expected payoff of
every user is 0. We then consider the best possible partition of the users into two sets H1,H2, and
show that OPT≤T (H1)+OPT
≤T (H2) = Ω
(√
NT
)
. This implies that for some choices by nature,
and for one of the sets Hi, the payoff of the central planner is less than OPT
≤T (Hi)−Ω
(√
TN
)
.
Theorem 8. For every algorithm for the central planner and every T , there exists a set of payoffs
and a set H such that
OPT≤T (H)− o
(√
NT
)
in expectation.
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Proof. Consider a strategy for nature in which each xt0 and x
t
1 is uniformly random, and each p
t is
a uniform ±1 random variable. It is easy to see that no matter how the central planner plays in
this game, the expectation of p≤T (H) = 0.
Given some enumeration of the users 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, we define the set H1 as follows. We include
all of the users 0, 1, . . . , N/2 in H1. We then inductively decide whether to include i > N/2 in H1
by evaluating the sum
Px =
∑
t≤T :xt1<x
t
0=x
xt1∈H1
pt +
∑
t≤T :xt0<x
t
1=x
xt0∈H
pt.
We include x in H1 if and only if Px > 0.
The sum defining each Px has in expectation at least T/(2N) terms, because 1/N of all interactions
involve user x and at least half of these interactions are with a user in |H1|. Each of these terms
is a uniform ±1 random variable. So the probability that Px > 0 is 12 and the expectation of Px,
given that Px > 0, is at least
√
T/N .
It is easy to see that OPT≤T (H1) =
∑
x∈H1
Px. Each term Px for x ≤ N/2 has expectation 0. In
expectation there are Ω (N) terms with x > N/2. Each of these terms is Ω
(√
T/N
)
in expectation.
Thus OPT≤T (H1) = Ω
(√
TN
)
.
We define H2 = [N ]\H1. We have OPT≤T (H2) = 0: for each pair x < y with x, y ∈ H2, the
event y ∈ H2 depends only on the sum Py, which is a sum of terms independent of any interactions
occurring between x and y. Thus if there is an interaction between x and y, its expected payoff is
0. Summing over pairs of users in H2, we obtain E
[
OPT(H2)
]
= 0.
Thus E
[
OPT≤T (H1) + OPT
≤T (H2)
]
= Ω
(√
TN
)
, while E
[
p≤T (H1) + p
≤T (H2)
]
= E
[
p≤T
(
[N ]
)]
=
0. In particular, E
[
OPT≤T (H1) + OPT
≤T (H2)− p≤T (H1)− p≤T (H2)
]
= Ω
(√
TN
)
, and so we
can find some particular strategy by nature and a set Hi such that p
≤T (Hi) ≤ OPT≤T (Hi) −
Ω
(√
TN
)
, as desired.
10 Appendix: Strengthened analysis of online local learning
Lemma 7. [4] For any E<t and any Et we have∣∣∣∣OLLε (E<t)−OLLε (E≤t)
∣∣∣∣
∞
≤ O
(
ε
∣∣∣Et∣∣∣
1
)
Proof. Note that the ℓ1 and ℓ∞ norms are dual. So this result follows directly from Lemma 8 in
[4] and Lemma 2.19 in [18].
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Theorem 9. [4] For any sequence Et and any X  0 with entries in [0, 1], we have
∑
t
〈
Et,OLLε
(
E<t
)〉
≥
∑
t
〈
Et,X
〉
−O

ε∑
t<T
∣∣∣Et∣∣∣2
1

−O (Nε−1)
where
∣∣Et∣∣
1
is the sum of the absolute values of the entries of Et.
Proof. By Lemma 2.3 of [18] and Lemma 5 of [4], for any X  0 with entries in [0, 1] we have:
∑
t
〈
Et,OLLε
(
E<t
)〉
≥
∑
t
〈
Et,X
〉
−O
(
Nε−1
)
+
∑
t
〈
Et,OLLε
(
E<t
)
−OLLε
(
E≤t
)〉
.
Using Lemma 7 we have
∑
t
〈
Et,OLLε
(
E<t
)
−OLLε
(
E≤t
)〉
≥ −
∑
t
∣∣∣Et∣∣∣
1
∣∣∣∣OLLε (E<t)−OLLε (E≤t)
∣∣∣∣
∞
= O

∑
t
ε
∣∣∣Et∣∣∣2
1


which gives the desired result.
11 Appendix: Open questions
We have presented a protocol for managing trust which achieves a qualitatively new—and surpris-
ingly strong—formal guarantee. But the theoretical picture is far from complete, and the proposed
protocol is far from practical. We hope that our model and algorithmic approach will inspire further
work in both of these directions, and in this section we highlight some areas for improvement and
elaboration.
Tighter regret bounds: Our regret bound ofO
(
ρ
3
√
T 2N
)
can probably be improved toO
(
ρ
√
TN
)
,
which translates into a significant performance improvement.
Perhaps more importantly, our regret bound depends on the total number of interactions.
This might be improved to depend only on the number of interactions involving an honest
user. The distinction is particularly important in settings where dishonest users can fabricate
large numbers of interactions amongst themselves.
With plausible parameters and performance goals in the favor setting, these improvements
could reduce the number of required interactions per user from tens of thousands to hun-
dreds10although the practical performance of the protocol might be better than the theoret-
ical worst case, as often happens Other performance improvements, such as distinguishing
between the average and maximal payoffs or improving the hidden constant factors, would
also help achieve a practical guarantee.
10.
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Distributed implementation: Although our protocol is is tractable in the sense of polynomial-
time, it is not distributed. Ideally each user’s computation and communication would be
polylogarithmic in the size of the community.
The main challenge is distributing the computation of the central planner, and particularly
the online learning algorithm at the core of our protocol. The current algorithm requires
semidefinite programming, which must be replaced by fast distributed computation, such
as random walks or sparse linear algebra. In addition to the algorithmic difficulties, the
computation must be robust to manipulation by adversarial users; this might be achieved
either by finding a computation which is inherently robust or by using cryptographic tools to
ensure accurate computation.
Simultaneous interactions: Our protocol assumes that interactions occur one at a time: after
one pair of users interacts, their reports immediately become available to the next pair of
users. In most contexts this is not a realistic assumption.
When applied to a setting with k simultaneous interactions, our protocol achieves regret Ω (k).
It is not hard to construct examples where the regret must necessarily be Ω (log k). We suspect
that this lower bound is tight, and that some protocol achieves regret O
(
ρ log k
√
TN
)
. Under
realistic assumptions, it may be possible to eliminate the dependence on k altogether.
Recommending vs. filtering: Our protocol answers questions of the form “should I interact
with this merchant?” rather than questions of the form “which merchant should I interact
with?” In many contexts the latter question is more useful—though deciding which users’
input to trust is a key difficulty for both problems. [3] provides a similar algorithm that
answers “which merchant should I interact with?” but exploits the simplifying assumption
that there is a single best merchant for all transactions. It is natural to try to combine these
two assumptions, and to design a protocol which recommends one resource from amongst k
options.
Strong signals: In our setting, most interactions provide only weak evidence about which users
are honest. We might expect to be able to obtain tighter bounds when very strong signals are
available. For example, a dishonest user might physically assault or threaten an honest user,
resulting in a payoff of −ρ∗ which could never occur in an interaction between honest users.
In this case, we would like to obtain a regret bound whose dependence on ρ∗ was O (ρ∗N),
independent of T .
Incentive compatibility: Our protocol has a robust theoretical guarantee, but only assuming
that there are some honest users who reliably follow the protocol. It would be better if
honesty were incentivized rather than assumed.
The honest players in our protocols report their payoff after each interaction, and pay a cost
which depends on their reported payoff. So an honest player could always benefit by stating
a lower payoff, and has no short-term incentive to play by the rules.
It is worth noting, however, that a player who follows this selfish approach will quickly find
that no one wants to interact with them. Though the optimal behavior involves lying, it
involves lying just enough that other users still benefit from interacting with me. In fact, a
community of users lying optimally can still lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Unfortunately, in an attempt to lie optimally an honest user may inadvertently destroy value.
In fact the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem applies to our setting, even when there are just
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two users,11 to show that this is necessarily the case: in general it is impossible to achieve our
desired guarantees at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We feel that our result is an attractive
compromise given this impossibility result.
We could still achieve actual incentive compatibility or approximate incentive compatibility in
many interesting cases where fundamental obstructions don’t arise; in general, we might hope
to translate positive results from the two-player iterated setting to our distributed setting.
Asymmetric interactions: Our protocols all require that interactions be symmetric on average,
or else make use of transfers to symmetrize them. This is a very strong condition that would
be nice to weaken.
One generalization is to consider sets of interactions that are balanced, so that each user has
as many opportunities to give as to receive overall, even though the pairwise interactions are
asymmetrical.
A more difficult generalization is to consider interactions that are inherently imbalanced, in
the sense that some users systematically have more opportunities to give than to receive.
In this case it is no longer possible to simultaneously maximize collective welfare for every
subgroup H. We could instead try to achieve Pareto efficiency, which is a weaker condition
but still meaningful if it holds for every set H simultaneously. For example, we might try to
ensure that no group H can benefit all of its members by adopting a different internal policy
and/or isolating itself from the users outside of H.
Honest supermajorities: Our guarantees are non-trivial even when the set H is a very large
fraction of [N ]. But in this case it may be able to obtain regret bounds that depend on(
N − |H|) rather than on N . In cases where 90% or 99% of users are honest, this could
amount to a large difference in performance.
Sybilproofness: Our system bounds the damage done by the introduction of any dishonest user.
In some settings it is easy for an attacker to create large numbers of dishonest users or sybils.
Our bounds are not tight enough to discourage such an attack.
It might be possible to ensure that the introduction of a dishonest user does no damage to
the honest users, or that the maximum possible damage done by dishonest users is bounded.
For example, if transfers are available, each user could pay an upfront deposit to cover any
possible damage they might inflict (in particular, a new user would need to pay a cost of at
least ρ before every interaction with an established user, which would potentially be refunded
if the interaction went well). Each honest user would need to pay a manageable cost to join
the system, but the cost would be large enough that attackers can only recoup it by becoming
productive members of the community.12
11Here is a very rough sketch of the argument. Consider our setting with transfers, where −pt0, p
t
1 are independently
distributed in [0, 1] and are the same in every round. Because H might contain only one user or might contain both,
a protocol that satisfies our guarantee must be incentive compatible and must maximize collective welfare (i.e. be ex
post efficient). We can use the average size of the transfer to sell an item valued at pt0 by the seller and p
t
1 by the
buyer, in a way that is incentive compatible and ex post efficient. By Myerson-Satterthwaite, we can conclude that
any protocol satisfying our guarantees is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In the setting of bilateral exchange, our protocol recommends that the honest users honestly state their willingness
to pay for the item, allocate it optimally, and then divide the surplus evenly. Evidently this is not a Nash equilibrium,
since a player can benefit by understating their surplus. This case captures the essential and unavoidable reason that
our protocol is not incentive-compatible.
12Impossibility results such as [16] do apply to this problem, but we are not aware of any that apply to our approach.
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Composition and complex protocols: Worst-case performance guarantees allow our protocol
to be used as a subroutine without compromising its correctness. Together with other building
blocks, our result might be used to design more complex protocols in the same way that simple
cryptographic primitives are used to build more complex cryptographic systems.
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